meh

Kristendom, Judendom och Osanningar

2011-09-07T12:58:00.001-07:00

Ofta kan man i kristna kretsar höra ett starkt stöd för Israel, för den judiska religionen och för judar i allmänhet. Detta i sig är inget problem. Ett problem, däremot, är att det bland kristna predikanter, talare och polemiker ljugs friskt om judendomens läror! Ofta framställs Jesus som den som äntligen gav icke-judar möjligheten att delta i ett förbund med Gud - fram tills golgata var förbundet stängt för den som inte föddes som barn till en judisk mor. Man framhäver att judendomen endast ser födda judar som judar - en sak som är ren och skär osanning. Judendomen ända från den skrivna Torahn, med tydliga exempel i Rut och i profeterna - främst kanske i Jesaja 56. Men också Jonah visar att till och med under gamla testamentets tid fanns det möjlighet för icke-judar att få förlåtelse från Gud. Varför är det en vanlig myt att judendomen enbart räknar födda judar som medlemmar, och att enligt GT (och Judendomen) enbart judar kan ha ett gudsförhållande? Nå, delvis har det väl att göra med att judendomen inte bara är en religion - det är också ett folk. Och från detta gör man en felaktig generalisering - om det är ett folk, följer det väl naturligt att man inte kan bli en medlem efter födelsen. (Delvis på grund av att man utgår ifrån en 1800-talside om vad ett "folk" ens är!) Det är ett välmenande misstag - man inser att judendomens medlemskoncept inte är precis samma som kristendomens, men ack så fel det blir.Men detta räcker inte för att förklara dethär misstagets inbitenhet. Jag har ett par gånger försökt i all vänskaplighet korrigera dethär misstaget - och bemötts med rätt negativa reaktioner. Om det bara handlar om ett oskyldigt misstag förstår jag inte den negativitet och den förnekelse som uppvisats. Är då detta faktafel verkligen ett problem? Faktafel förekommer ju överallt, och i någon mån kan man ju förvänta sig sådana i alla kontexter. Nå, här är ett av problemen att folk har tagit till sig detta faktafel - delvis för att folk har en ganska förenklad bild på religioner, och det här påståendet om judendomen låter rätt trovärdigt i ljuset av hurudant kristendomen är. Och när folk inte heller vet särdeles mycket om vad judendomens frälsningslära går ut på, judendomens syn på ickejudar, etc etc, så blir ofta folks antaganden helt enkelt en interpolering från vad de vet om kristnedomen - judendomen antas helt enkelt vara kristendomen utan Jesus + kanske vissa andra negativa saker (tillräckligt ofta hör man om judarnas lagiskhet och så vidare, så ...). Man börjar lätt anta att judarna, precis som de kristna, lär ut att enbart medlemmar av deras egna lära kan komma till himlen. Men man lägger till påståendet att enbart infödda kan accepteras som medlemmar, vilket ju mer eller mindre är att rakt direkt få folk att tänka att judarnas himmelrike har en rasistisk portvakt.Att man påstår att judarnas frälsningslära är rent av rasistisk kommer knappast att skapa mycket välvilja mot judarna - 'varför skulle jag sympatisera med, eller ens tolerera, någon som tror att jag av födseln automatiskt kommer att hamna i helvetet och att inte ens Gud försökt sträcka ut sin hand till att ge mig en möjlighet till gemenskap med Honom' - en tanke som säkert förekommer både bland troende angående judarna, en icke-troendes variant vore säkert mera i stil med "varför skulle jag sympatisera med någon som tror jag är ofrälsbart född till att hamna i helvetet". Också icke-troende hör ibland kristna predikanter tala om saker som detta. Och en kristen predikant som prima facie är pro-judisk i sin inställning borde ju vara en trovärdig källa om judisk teologi, eller hur? Att judendomen inte har en rasistisk frälsningslära av det snitt den ofta utmålas med är sen en bisak - de flesta som hör om judendomen via kristna källor kommer att tro att judarna tror att alla av icke-judisk börd automatiskt är dömda till helvetet. Hur kan man säga att den som välsignar Israel själv blir välsignad, medan man med samma mun som yttrat den välsignelsen gödslar antijudaismens och antisemitismens rötter?Jag tänker troligen ännu försöka hinna skriva ett inlägg om insmugen (möjligen omedveten eller oavsiktlig) antijudaism och antisemitism i kristna källor. Vad jag gärna vill veta är vad folk här tror är orsaken till att denna del av judendomen så ofta beskrivs felaktigt av kristna, och varför jag bemötts med viss fientlighet när jag påpekat det. Jag önskar också att kristna förklarar vad man kan göra åt detta, och vad de anser om fenomenet. Har ni hört detta påstående? Har ni reagerat på att det är ren bullshit? Har ni sagt något högt om det eller bara tyst bevittnat det?

2011-09-02T07:01:00.000-07:00

Detta inlägg var ursprungligen skrivet för kyrkpressens blog, och postades en kort tid före kyrpressen-bloggen lades ner.

Ofta hör man kristna säga något i stil med "kristendomen är inte en religion, det är ett förhållande till den treenige Guden/Jesus/den Heliga Anden", och när detta blivit sagt, kan ofta diskussionen inte fortsätta i vettiga spår. Den vars kritik eller påståenden bemötts med detta märkliga svar har inte fått sin kritik bemött - det hela är en så kallad red herring på engelska - ett argument som inte har något med saken att göra, men som förskjuter diskussionen från de verkliga sakfrågor som lyfts fram. Lite som att lyfta fram monopolpjäser på ett schackbräde för att rädda sig från schack matt.

Vad är då poängen som man försöker framföra med detta påstående? Ofta är det nog att påpeka att till skillnad från andra religioner är kristendomen inte ett regelsystem, det är inte ett ritualsystem, det är inte en doktrinsamling. Men nog är det ju en samling doktriner - och om man inte omfattar doktrinerna, då är ens förhållande nog något man inte egentligen har (säg, t.ex. treenigheten). Och om man inte försöker följa somliga av reglerna, då har man nog knappast heller ett sant gudsförhållande (homosexualitet, föräktenskapligt sex, är väl kanske de två tydligaste, men flera finns och varierar lite bland de kristna). Ritualaspekten är nu kanske den aspekt där delar av kristendomen kan komma längst ifrån en sån karikerad ide av vad religion är - beroende på om det sen är högkyrkligt, lågkyrkligt eller rent av katolskt eller ortodoxt kan kristendomen vara mycket ritualistisk den med. Om man är av de mera radikala protestantiska sorterna har man kanske ett faktiskt avstånd till sådan kristendom - men det ändrar inte att majoriteten av kristendomen har ett rikt ritualliv. Förstås, man kanske anser att katoliker, ortodoxa och kanske till och med högkyrkliga protestanter inte är sanna kristna.

Om det är sant att kristendomen inte är en religion, men är ett förhållande - hur är det då med de religioner en del kristna menar att leds av onda andar? Är inte isåfall new age och hinduism och islam förhållanden också? Förhållanden till onda andar, iofs, men det gör dem inte mindre förhållandelika för det - förhållanden kan vara parasitiska, förhållanden kan vara olyckliga och de kan vara mycket ohälsosamma. Men isåfall har vi gjort religionskonceptet oanvändbart. Är det inte då bättre och smartare att acceptera att något kan vara ett förhållande och en religion samtidigt?

Har inte den religiöse juden ett förhållande till det judiska samhället, till den judiska lagen och det judiska tankesättet? Känner han inte att han, genom att studera Torahn, lär sig känna Gud och Guds vilja - i judendomen tror man Torahn är Guds ord på ett sätt som lite liknar hur kristna tror Jesus är Guds Ord blivet till kött. Muslimen som studerar koranen och hadither och annan sunnah och så vidare har också ett förhållningssätt och ett förhållande till ummah - det muslimska samfundet som helhet. I jämförelse blir det kristna kravet att enskilt få exkluderas från benämningen 'religion' då det egentligen är ett förhållande ganska skevt! Det låter som om kristna berättar åt okristna par att de inte har ett förhållande för att de har en annorlunda dynamik i sitt förhållande. Eller som om jag sade åt någon som gav sin flickvän blommor mera sällan än jag gör, men som kokar mat mera ofta åt henne än jag gör att det inte är ett sant förhållande, då det är annorlunda från det jag och min flickvän har!

Religion-konceptet har utvecklats _i Europa_, bland kristna. Jag menar inte att religioner är ett Europeiskt påfund, men konceptet - kategorin vi tänker oss när vi hör ordet "religion" är skapat i det kristna Europa. När studiet av andra religioner påbörjades utgick man ofta ifrån att kristendomen var urtypen för religion - så man utgick ifrån att andra religioner erbjöd andra (och naturligtvis sämre) svar på samma frågor som kristendomen gav svar på. Alltså - kristendomen har ofta varit urtypen för vad man antagit att en religion är! Lite knepigt, iofs, är att när kristna europeer först kom i kontakt med främmande religioner som man inte bara kunde nedsättande klassa som "hedendom" - så var det judendom och islam man kom i kontakt med. Islam liknar väldigt på kristendomen, och ger svar på ungefär samma frågor - om än svaren skiljer sig. Judendomen har man aldrig riktigt - före rätt nyligen - låtit undersöka som en religion i sig, utan man har projicerat en massa kristna antaganden på den. Så religionskonceptet är egentligen färgat av att Islam och Kristendomen liknar varandra.

Det visar sig att när man försöker förstå hinduism, shia-islam, judendom, buddhism, sikhism, oromo, hedendom, nyreligiösa rörelser, ... att man ofta måste lära sig helt annorlunda tankesätt för att förstå vad kärnan i dessa religioner är. Med att lära sig tankesätt menar jag inte att man måste omfatta dem - man kan förstå judiskt tankesätt rätt bra utan att tro på judendomen, och samma kan nog stämma vad gäller sikhism, oromo, zoroastrism eller bahai också. Personligen har jag i flera år försökt förstå den judiska kulturen/religionen, och i någon mån tror jag jag skulle påstå att jag förstått den bättre än de flesta andra ickejudar. (Om än förstås det säkerligen finns hundratals andra ickejudar som förstår judendomen bättre än jag gör.) Att förstå en kultur/religion man inte växt opp i ger en viss insikt om hurpass annorlunda olika religioner är.

Ordet religion är av latinskt ursprung. Vi vet inte riktigt säkert vad det betydde - det finns några förslag på dess ursprungliga betydelse. En av dessa betyder, mer eller mindre, återknytelse, återkoppling eller att dra närmare - och var mycket omtyckt av Augustinus. Hans tycke för denna term har säkerligen kopplingar till kristen frälsningslära - ideen att förhållandet mellan mänska och gud återfåtts, att Gud drog de kristna in i sin famn, etc.

Ett annat förslag är att det kommer från att läsa noggrant - relego (eller möjligen en dissimilerad tidigare reduplicerad form le-lego) - ursprungligen då från ett "läsa igen (och igen och ...)"- ett intensivt noggrant läsande och lärande. Själva läsandet i sig är inte det viktiga i betydelsen där, utan det att man följer texten och håller den för viktig. Vilket kristna gör!

I och för sig faller jag nu lite i ett etymologiskt felslut - ord kan betyda annat än de ursprungligen betydde, men i detta fall tycker jag mig ha etablerat att användningen - och därmed hur folk faktiskt förstår det - sällan motsvarar det de som använder påståendet "kristendomen är inte en religion, det är ett förhållande" tolkar det som. De tolkar det som något som närmast liknar (en nidbild av*) fariseism.

Jag anser att för att föra en vettig diskussion om andliga saker, om religioner i allmänhet, etc, måste alla acceptera att kristendomen har klart religiösa element, och också att religion-konceptet egentligen närmast passar in på kristendomen, mer än på andra religioner. Att peka ut kristendomen som något unikt icke-religiöst är ett misstag, och är bara en rökridå i debatter. En rökridå som därtill döljer en stor del av vad kristendomen genom historien stått för, ännu står för, och vad den är. Kristendomen handlar också om ecklesia - kyrkan - inte bara om den enskilde troendes förhållande till Gud. Bibeln talar till och med mycket om kyrkan som ett samhälle, mera än den talar om den enskilde troende. (Och om man tar in gamla testamentet och ser Israel som en symbol för kyrkan kommer man att inse att de troendes gemenskap - ett religiöst samhälle - är ett centralt tema.

Detta inlägg postades ursprunligen på kyrkpressen, delvis som reaktion på ett av svaren på tråden om yoga - http://www.kyrkpressen.fi/content/view/34366/#comm_84820 - där detta helt irrelevanta argument lyftes fram av någon orsak. Förvisso är han som skrev inlägget anonym, vilket i någon mån bryter mot förväntat beteende på kyrkpressens bloggsidor.

*(Den nidbilden av farisaismen har jag haft för avsikt att skriva en del mera om, kommer ett inlägg med rejält med referenser så småningom!)

2011-03-11T01:26:00.000-08:00

yay. i just got my peavey predator (a stratocaster copy) returned to me after a bit of surgery on it. it's been turned fretless :)

the sound is a bit muffled, kind of bebop-jazzy, although the sustain is way better than I expected. but I don't mind that. it is tons of fun. the impression after two hours of playing with it: well worth the investment. really injected new life into an instrument I pretty much had forgotten I had.

let's hope it makes time pass faster until my dearest returns from america.

2010-12-25T05:27:00.000-08:00

What principles did Jesus advocate when it came to interpreting the Torah and giving rulings based on it?

On one hand, he seems to suggest that the quality of actions and of the mind, regardless of commandments in the Torah, are the measure: e.g. But those things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart; and they defile the man.

He never says how far this can be extended - could, e.g. sexual morals be interpreted by this method? (It's not the kind of sex or the kind of partner, it's to what purpose or whatever?) Where's the demarcation line for how far this method can be extended?

Whence does the principle in Matthew 19, "Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder." Can this be extended to What God has made X, let not man make un-X? Can it be extended to what God has forbidden, man cannot permit? What God has permitted, man cannot forbid?

I should reread the entire gospels, I am kind of certain there's one more principle there, but it wasn't present in matthew. So, rereading them before the next post.

2010-09-27T14:23:00.000-07:00

I have recently been trying out some non-octave scales, and I think they contain a lot of potential that is yet untapped.

Some ideas however:

How about having a nonoctave repeat interval, but add all the inverses of all the intervals less wide than an octave - thus, basically, having a limited selection of octaves available.

Take for instance, the 3/2 in 8 scale, with a smallest step of ~87.75 cents.

We get

87.75
175.50
263.25
351.00
438.75
526.50
614.25
702.00

What we need to get an octave is adding these:
498.00
585.75
...
which amounts to having every other step be 27.25 cents and every other be 60.50. Ok, that gets a bit unwieldy, and I have no idea what new intervals pop in except octaves and octave inversions.

This might work better with some other scale - maybe Bohlen-Pierce or somesuch would be well suited.

2010-07-11T15:09:00.000-07:00

The more I look at Bohlen-Pierce theory, the absence of any discussion of utonal stuff strikes me as more and more peculiar. Even more so, very many of the 'major' scales include the utonal chord from the same root, and the 'minor' scales don't necessarily exclude the otonalities either.

Some have complained about modulation and such not being very clear in Bohlen-Pierce, and I wonder if this inclusion of both utonal and otonal structures for the tonic might be part of that? OTOH, borrowed chords in 12tet don't tend to cause big problems so ...?

2010-07-05T07:22:00.001-07:00

The Bohlen-Pierce temperament is an interesting sort of odd option to try out, which has a very good approximation of 3:5:7 and 5:7:9-chords, but I've never seen anyone talk about the utonal 7/7:7/5:7/3 or 9/9:9/7:9/5 chords - in fact, it's like the assumption is that 5:7:9 in fact is the bohlen-pierce analogy of a minor chord despite being a tritave inversion (if that's *perceivable* as an inversion at all). This is a bit weird, imho, and I'd be interesting in seeing whether there's any relevant reason for this.

Alas, Elaine Walker doesn't elaborate enough on the chords she used in her research paper - she only really mentiosn the 3:5:7 wide triad and 5:7:9 narrow triad, but the piano roll transcription sort of suggests some other things going on there - but they're hard to read.

I think, considering the nature of the intervals being well approximated by Bohlen-Pierce, it might be possible to transcribe compositions from it to 31-tet without many problems - will have to try this idea out at some point. That'd be pretty neat. Non-octave scales in equally divided octave temperaments are quite underused!

(Also, I should try out 3/2 in 4 or 5 and somesuch, might be interesting)

2010-06-22T14:09:00.001-07:00

I am happy to've started playing around with 31-tet again. The timbre I'm working on right now is a sort of organ-like thing in one way, and sort of clarinety in another (that one's attributable to only having odd harmonics). I should also prolly make some more varying timbres, and I should absolutely figure out some way of getting a sensibly pretty, yet distinctive and individual kind of attack to the sounds.

Gonna try out some approximations of 5:6:7 (and the utonal 7/7, 7/6, 7/5 subdim chord), 5:7:9 chords, maybe some 9/9:9/7:9/5-ish stuff, and of course just living up the septimal bliss that 7/4 and 7/6 provide. (7/5 sounds less nice, but meh, can't have everything).

After expending some effort on finding a document I don't think I've read since 2005, I found http://www.huygens-fokker.org/docs/modename.html again. It's apparently moved around a bit since back in the day. I remember trying a few of those scales last time rather haphazardly. I hope my increased knowledge of counterpoint, harmony, etc will give me better chances of composing something worthwhile.

I haven't composed anything microtonal since 2003ish!

2010-04-27T12:53:00.000-07:00

I wonder how well adaptive timbre could work? Could we have timbres that coincide perfectly for fifths, thirds, sevenths(ish) without having to do adaptive tuning? Just, you know, FFTing the input signal, picking out the odd-numbered overtones, raising the third harmonic by 2c, the fifth by 14, the seventh by something like 30c, etc. (With a synthesized signal it would be easier, of course, since no adjustment of input after FFTing it is needed)

Would different tones of a chord need them differently adjusted? Is there a way to uniformly adjust harmonics for all tones so that 12tet basically would have the benefits of JI when it comes to harmonics coinciding? Or is this a pipe dream? Would the timbres sound way too weird?

Could there be a non-equal adjustment that wouldn't be adaptive, such that e.g. Dmaj and Gmaj, despite having the identical 1:2^(4/12):2^(7/12) frequency patterns have different enough out-of-tune harmonics to, despite both sounding good and major still sounding interestingly distinct, a bit like a timbral equivalent to the non-equal temperaments that were in vogue before 12tet?

2010-04-15T18:31:00.000-07:00

A reason I don't much like the kind of linguistic prescriptivism based in armchair-linguistic musings of people into a sort of logician/engineering/whatever mindset is basically to do with how language and our minds and our social situations have evolved.

Basically, what happens when you let evolution run on some system that can be designed evolutionarily, it will often take into account features of the underlying systems that the human designer is not aware of.

Secondarily, language as a system is sort of distributed. No one knows every word of their language (with some trivial exceptions, but these are 'degenerate' cases, especially languages on the brink of extinction), no one knows every construction, etc. Constructions spread when people pick up that they're constructions, which means that for a construction to gain ground, there must be something that gives away that it is a construction in the first place, it needs to fill a purpose, it needs to be easy enough to apply by analogy, etc. So, we have a system where there's a lot of evolutionary algorithms going on all over the place, and the best thing is - the protocol by which these innovations spreads is itself affected by these changes. We're having evolutionary algorithms within evolutionary algorithms. This, in turn, in a really distributed system, which also has interfaces with other similar systems (== other languages, by means of bilingual speakers or anyone in a language contact situation!) ...

The number of fields one should understand to grasp why languages are like they are probably exceeds what anyone can learn in a lifetime. Probably, any number of the weirder things in language - quirky case, irregular forms, discongruence (e.g. the Semitic system where numbers over four or somesuch are marked for the opposite gender of the nouns they govern), congruence, differential object marking, aspect marked on the object instead of on the verb (making aspect unmarkable on intransitives and quirky case verbs) are results of optimizations that have made sense for the distributed memetic(ish) algorithm that designs language all the time. The reanalyzis of how to use the non-nominative pronouns in English probably also fit in with this - in lack of other supporting structures, lots of minds have converged on using them in a way that marks some kind of distinction that is more relevant for them to mark than whatever was marked earlier.

For a human to optimize this is doomed to failure. He's unlikely to have an idea of the uses of most of the stuff in the language, and will cut out stuff that it is based on, and add in parts that seem logical or easily processable, but haven't gone through centuries of optimization.

I'm also considering calling 'evolution' an intelligent process, since it solves problems.

I guess this kind of subverts the Intelligent Design people's position. At least I hope so.

2009-06-12T07:48:00.000-07:00

As ideas pile up in margins of notebooks, on scraps of paper, in random files on a variety of computers, etc, one interesting problem arises. They do not necessarily conform to the other ideas that have gone before them, and therefore either require 1) new projects, 2) reform of old projects, 3) changes in the idea or 4) discarding. Now that I took the time to finally organize the ideas of the last few years - ideas that have been amassing since before I made the current version of Bryatesle, I realize I haven't actually done much of the actual organizatory work needed for my kind of conlanging. Part of the creative work is done, but since the organization of this material also is a creative act, much remains before any of this could be called a conlang. Some of the ideas offer possible glimpses into fascinating structures, though.
These ideas have occured at any time, and been recorded quickly (alas, as you'll soon see, also somewhat unorganizedly) on whatever surface it could be recorded on.

Now, part of a problem I am discovering (again) is that Past Miekko doesn't communicate very well. In part, this is because I write unclearly and fragmentarily, in the illusion that what I mean is obvious.
The italic text is the note itself, the text afterwards the further creative process when pairing it with a language and wondering whether there's conflicts with earlier ideas etc. I am trying to catch the thinking I would do as closely as possible.
Anyways, here's some nuggets of what I've come up with.

coordination - no coordinating particle needed for simple 'and'. constraints: same case (but also abl + dat permitted)
relatively easy to understand, but i left out which conlang this was meant for. My guess is bryatesle, since its case system would permit rather nifty ways of distinguishing noncoordinated from coordinated nouns, but Tatediem and Dairwueh are just as likely.

rcp + weak agentivity -> subj[1](high anim)
obj/subj[2](low anim).sec subj
rcp + strong agenitivity
-> subj.rcp.obj subj.rcp.obj
clearly something to do with reciprocality. the case system used in the glossish things imply bryatesle. I guess this simply means that reciprocal stuff is done in Bryatelse as if it were normal transitivity but with additional markers on the subject and object. What exactly strong and weak agentivity mean in this context was left unspecified, so I guess I have to figure that out?

"between" as in N[1].dat.rcp.obj+N[2].dat.rp.obj
pretty ok way of rendering 'between'
obviously bryatesle, not much more work needed except coming up with the word 'in' in the first place.

only the 3sgII-form of a verb can be fronted; 3sgII can be used with 0-subjects, 3sgI otoh permits subject omission (because it is more clearly bound to a real 3sg subject)
these are likely dairwueh-thingies, since it has two verb forms that I call 3sgI/3sgII, altho' in fact the 3sgII is not purely a third person verb - it's less strictly bound to person, but still most likely to pop up in 3/impersonal situations.

'in +dative (or whichever) being the normal way of that adposition, with the exception of x.nom AUX (presumably along the lines of 'to have', but possibly exceptionally marked) obj.instr in + y.accusative for 'x put/poked/threw/placed/whatever obj in y (with implication of this having been done somewhat violently)'
probably dairwueh, due to the nom-acc alignment, altho' it could also be bryatesle.
also, in +dat is what the previous bryatesle idea says is the normal way, so I guess that helps qualifying this as a more or less set idea!

These were examples of the oldest notes I've been finding - I've since then taken to organizing them somewhat better in a notebook specifically for ideas (altho' not limited to conlanging ideas - ideas for algorithms, stories, compositions, experiments in music theory, outlines for posts in religious debates, rather imprecise calculations of the n:th power of the o:th root of p, etc etc also occur), they've taken to being a bit more organized - I (very) recently took to tagging every conlangy idea with a set of marks, and numbering them.

have a large number of different participles, e.g. 'active participle of future obligation', 'active participle of fulfilled obligation', 'passive participle of likelihood', etc etc. few verbs have a full paradigm, and different verbs tend to have different sets of these participles. [try at some point making an elaboration of this with example systems].
This seems to be an idea that would require a language of its own, or could maybe work in dairwueh (less likely in tatediem, but I'll have a look). Coming up with a rich morphology isn't something I like doing a lot, but I guess this is a good enough idea to warrant it.

related: transitive and causative verbs for intransitives are formed by aux + trns/caus participle (cf how English forms passives)
This idea actually predates the prior idea, but it's just popped up every now and then and I never wrote it down until rather recently.

auxiliary for future tense comes in two flavours - transitive AND volitional intransitive subjects versus nonvolitional intransitive subjects.
pretty basic, really. prolly put it in dairwueh, might put it in tatediem? Tatediem being ergative, this could be kinda cool, but on the other hand why not put it in a nom-acc language?

nominal classes otherwise not marked except by auxes showing agreement through suppletion - often with partially incomplete paradigms, to a lesser degree similar agreement through adpositions and even less so - again mostly through suppletion and lexically determined thingies - for adjectives.
doesn't work for B, T or D, but I have plans for a future, more isolating language. This fits in with that, but on the other hand, it'd be interesting to build a more complex system of classifiers and stuff, but wth, this could be rather neat.

2009-05-19T08:33:00.000-07:00

removed because a re-worked version is in the works

2009-03-30T10:32:00.000-07:00

Lots of hobby-linguists, especially among fans of auxiliary and logical languages, and also among fans of natural languages seem to think that double negatives are an illogical and ugly thing. Fans of logic seem to think it violates some need for clarity of thought, and that this is because it's fundamentally illogical somehow. On the other hand, people interested in naturalism seem to think it is a proof that language is something completely divorced from logic.

Both of these notions are wrong. Of course, they both stem from the thought that not(not(x)) must equal x, and that if it equals x the system no longer is logical.

Granted, language is not fully logical - often, phrases get meanings that are somewhat divorced from the meaning of the subcomponents; but this is mostly because of how we think - we don't think fully logically all the time, but rather in a fuzzy cloud of ideas and associations and connections, and we want to convey a likeness of this cloud, rather than an exact copy of a chain of very clearly delineated ideas. Most of the quirks of language probably come from how our brains work, and how it matches patterns, and will, for instance, associate a phrase more with a situation than with the meaning of the phrase, or somesuch, after some time. Given some thought, it's obvious that the communication between systems that works on such premises, where the protocols for communication are somewhat fluid, where the information often isn't even completely formalizeable, etc, will be somewhat illogical; yet, it often is surprisingly logical, and without some level of logic in it, it would get very difficult to use at all.

But anyways, back to double negation. It's assumed to be illogical, because in usual e.g. boolean algebra, !!x = x; analogously, in arithmetics, -(-(x)) = x; however, why should we assume that the negating function in a given language is -() or !()? Why not assume it is f(x) = 0x? What will be the value of f(f(f(f(x))))? yes, it's gonna be 0000x, which == 0x == 0. (Let's, for readability and parseability and clarity retain the x there.) Is multiplication by zero illogical because it doesn't alternate between x and 0, the way multiplication by -1 alternates between -x and x? Is this proof that maths is illogical?
No, it's not, but by extension, it's also disproof of one common proof that language is illogical, and I hope everyone would stop claiming that double negatives are illogical and therefore bad, or that they are illogical and therefore proof that language is illogical.

There are benefits to such a negating function as well - no need to keep track of how many negations there are stacked, since as long as there's at least one, the result will be negative; whereas for a system where negations cancel out, you need to keep track of whether you're negative or not at any given point. That is rather taxing.

However, I generally think the search for a totally logical language is misguided and fails to appreciate how our neural network handles information and thoughts.

2009-03-20T07:14:00.000-07:00

I came across a post by Radius Solis on the ZBB which touched a topic I've generally not cared to think about, but being in need of some procrastination, I decided to think about it.

Here is the post:
"Hmm... I wonder. Various languages categorize nouns in various ways - by shape, by gender or animacy, by their utility to humans, by whether they are considered to be inherently possessed, and all sorts of other odds and ends. What languages, if any, categorize their verbs in a similar manner? And on what semantic basis? And where is the categorization marked?"

I would consider the Slavic motion verbs vs. other verbs such a distinction; these use the various prefixes (generally derived from prepositions) in a much more consistent way than do other verbs, and they have an added dimension in their aspectual system (altho' many grammars will state that this added distinction is not an aspect, I think it is close enough for this post to say that they have two axes of aspect whereas other verbs just have one).

I wouldn't be surprised, however, if for nouns, the categorization generally is fixed, and for verbs it's more generally derivative? So that, say, the closest analogy to 'by utility for humans', which I'd for no particular reason say is 'beneficialness for humans', the classification gets more tricky for verbs. Right, knives per se are very utilizeable by humans, but cutting ... can go both ways? Of course, a knife can be a bad thing as well in the wrong hand, ... do languages that classify nouns along utility have these classes as statical classes or do they permit changing stuff around?

As for classification along possession, shape, etc. The Slavic verbs of movement sort of go into the 'shape' slot, on some semantic grounds; verbs of movement have a specific sort of shape that other verbs might lack (altho' some verbs that indicate movement, iirc, don't qualify in some Slavlangs, so it's a rather exclusive club of verbs). Possession would make sense for verbs that mark actions that are culturally limited to various classes of people; maybe a verb that can only be performed by one gender would completely lack gender marking? Or have a different morpheme instead of the usual gender marking? Or whatever, but there's possibilities.
(C.f. the Russian verbs for marrying, where the verb for females actually is a prepositional phrase, za muzh / za muzhem, literally 'to behind the man' / 'behind the man', and for males, zhenitsya, 'to wife oneself [someone]' or whatever we'll literally translate it as - that is, to take oneself someone for wife' or such. That's an interesting classificational detail, altho' again, it's not really an entire classificational system, but nevertheless...)

This ties neatly in with one design idea I have for dairwueh, viz. the idea that the case of the object (accusative or some oblique case or partitive, not sure yet) marks whether the action is considered beneficial for the speaker (and listener, depending on in what standing they are) or not. Of course, this is neither derivational, nor a classification. It is rather just extra information added on.

Not a very coherent post, just some stuff that doesn't really add up to anything yet.

2006-10-11T05:46:00.000-07:00

Choices choices choices.

Slackware or FreeBSD? Since I got my old HD back I am sitting here with Windows with settings and files that date back 30 months... and dying to get back to Unixdom, but thingy is: I don't want to install (k)Ubuntu, and altho' I *love* Gentoo, this machine isn't exactly that optimal for it - long compilations aren't really fun when the machine can suddenly shut down on you with no warning whatsoever.

FreeBSD might actually be what I try. The lack of a floppy drive on this machine requires some extra magic in order to install Slackware.

Also, I am rereading the beginning of Berakhot in order to find the folios I had in mind for my little Talmud feature.

EDIT: I decided to go with Slackware.

2006-10-07T14:40:00.000-07:00

I am not a Talmudic scholar.

I have not read very much of the Talmud, and what I have read has been snippets from translations. Well, some of the snippets correspond to 20-ish folios, so it's not like I have only seen a couple of disjunct quotes - the kind that various antisemites, various shady versions of missionaries and some antireligious people like to quote.

Anyways, the Talmud has a rather strange structure, at least to the reader acquainted with modern scholarly writing, modern prose and generally also western literature.
I have no idea, however, how it compares to moslem philosophical, theological and jurisprudential writings. They may provide a match.

To demonstrate this, one will need to devote some time, and the needed sample text would span several folios of Talmud. I have a few specific parts in mind, one of which also often is used as a so-called proof text that the Talmud is racist (if it is, at least this specific text is not, which raises the question why so many alleged racist proof texts either are not racist or do not even exist in the first place ...)

However.
My harddrive died some weeks ago, and this is a sort of impediment to my progress. Even tho' I like textmode unix (and my livecds with X on them haven't started, whereas my gentoo install cd from the fall of 2004 starts, giving me access to text-only elinks, irssi and ssh, oh, and text-based adventure games.

I just got my hands on a spare HD, so after I have installed it, done some homework assignments (pthreads and hash tables) I will get right to locating those folios of talmud, trying to provide a sensible interpretation, and showing how the logics are consistent and hang together, over a surprising span of topics.

2005-09-14T17:51:00.000-07:00

I have one particular favourite verse in the Bible. The Bible is a book that might be, well, as it might be, but on occasion, it really shows some great sentiments and incredible human acts of selflessness.

(Exodus 32:32) Yet now, if thou wilt forgive their sin--; and if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book which thou hast written.

Some christian apologists have tried to diminish what Moses really said or did here - not in order to diminish it per se, but by trying to use it as a defense for vicarious atonement. There's nothing about it though that suggests that the author - or the persons involved - had anything like vicarious atonement in mind. It doesn't say 'forgive their sins and blot me out', it says 'if you don't forgive their sins, blot me out of that book'.

Of course, one of the questions it raises is whatever that book is. I've seen some semimystical commentaries suggest a very rational, pun that works in Hebrew, but ...
anyway, to get to my point, I like this.

Moses basically tells God that 'if those sinners can't partake in your forgiveness regardless of their attitude, I'm with them'.

I wish more people would emulate him.

2005-08-11T12:28:00.000-07:00

This is a small essay I wrote about a year ago (don't remember exactly) for a certain forum. I've been thinking of having it sent to some christian magazines in Finland, possibly. It needs some editing though, since the metaphorical language I use at some places is a tad too obscure, and some of the events I refer to might need some specifications. Enjoy, and comment.

Confrontations and dialogues between judaism and christianity have almost always been on christian conditions. The medieval disputes were rigged by christian clergy, mere plays were the rabbi had to say his lines which of course ended him up losing. The notable exception, of course, got the victorious rabbi exiled.
Later, the reformation didn't change the basic idea, though some of the implementations were altered. It still was designed so the christians were in a win-win situation. Now, the idea was that jews should be shown compassion and friendship so they would embrace christianity. When they didn't, this was retracted. We see another example in the laws that forbade conversion to Judaism in most of Europe, up to the 19th century - christianity had a monopoly on conversions. The same goes for the 19th and early 20th century ministries to the jews in Europe, especially Germany, whose members - many of whom still lived during the mid of the 20th century - by and large looked the other way while the jews were exterminated, in case they weren't even directly supportive of the final solution. We see it in Sweden, where jews could not hold higher office until the 50's. The idea seems to be that the jew can be afforded human rights as long as he has not yet proven to be beyond grace, stubborn and faithful to his own religion; as long as there is a chance that he might become christian he is a human being. But the lesser the chance shrinks, the less human he is, an enemy of all men, having the Devil as his father, progenity of vipers.

When the jew doesn't accept christ, it is suddenly the christians' obligation to get angered, and somehow punish him. This is the christians setting the rules at its worst: the premise is that since they're right, they've got not only the divine approval of doing so, no, they are even divinely obliged to do so. A quote from one of the christians who frequented this forum might illustrate this opinion: "Is it anger or frustration? Let's say you have a stubborn mule, all the sweet talking you can do will just make him sleepy, and he lies down for a nap! Luther should have refreshed his mind about what scripture says about some hearts. But still, the frustration!". With this in mind, what will happen when the so called "evangelical embrace" wears off? Considering the acrobatics they involve themselves in redefining 'antisemitism' so that Luther is freed of that accusation, the leeway for hating jews and judaism without being antisemitic by christian measures is considerable. Disconcertingly.

Christianity can't stand it when it suddenly loses the initiative, the right to set the rules. Israel ruled in its law that no more evangelizers may enter than there were at the foundation of the state. This is a highly offensive fact to christians, and there are lots of them that travel there without permission to evangelize, but still do so. They get the visas for students, guest workers or journalists; they deceive the jewish state and the jewish people to plant their foreign dogmas on Israeli soil. They are offended when Israel creates odd conditions for evangelism on radio (limiting broadcasts either to the English language only, or Hebrew on a frequency that is only used by the Israeli Arabs otherwise...), but they don't understand it when jews are offended by the masses of misinformation about the jewish religion in christian schools, literature, media and sermons. Only the christians have the right to set the conditions, they won't play a game they haven't designed.

Whenever the christians have been playing by rules set by others, they've either cheated or used the military power of the christian nations so that the rules'd be changed - the Opium War, although not per se a crusade, got a few elements of it, when one of the demands during the negotiations for peace was that China accept way more missionaries. True Christians, of course, did not start that war, so they came away with their hands clean, but like a buzzard, they descended on the corpse and had a feast.

The fact that the rule is, "jews are entitled to human rights as long as they are potential christians", is the true reason why many jews, and rightly so, fear there is antisemitism in nearly all christian kindness.
I fear that the same treatment will be given the moslem communities in strongly christian areas, as well as gipsies and other non-christian minorities. When they settle down and retain their unbelief, they suddenly will no longer be welcome. As for christians setting the rules, the moslems in west have gotten a few experiences already, in the theological disputes between these two religions. A christian is entitled to tell the world that he worships the same God as the jews. The moslem, however, who says that the moslems worship the same deity that the christians do, will provoke hard feelings from the christians. Why is the christian allowed to express his opinion of another religions deity, when the moslem must not? Is it perchance, because christianity is superior? Islam, however, has an insurance policy which judaism lacks - sheer number of adherents.

The jews, however, have another problem coming. Christianity has never managed to have a balanced relation to the jewish religion-people. They are obsessed with jews. For some reason, an observant orthodox jew is worthy of an effort that the christian would not care to give a jew whose parents converted for working in higher office, and who is secular or fully assimilated. Obviously, it is better that a jew be insincerely christian, than sincerely jewish. Is being consciously jewish somehow offensive to the christian? Even in a way that being secular is not? Isn't this a kind of antisemitism - get rid of the culture and the people will get rid of itself? This is exactly what happened to most jewish immigrants to Norway after the holocaust, whereafter the local ministry to the jews, Norska Israelmissionen, decided there was no need to evangelize the new immigrants, since they were already converting in masses. I think they did realize that these jews mostly were converting only in order to assimilate, not because of any heart-felt belief in Christianity, and this is telling: as long as they cease from judaism the objective is achieved. Do they want rid of judaism? Yes. Can one hate a culture, such as judaism, without hating those whose lives are formed by it? No. However, they can love the 'body' of a jew - since in the future, it just might be the container of a christian mind. The jewish mind is by its very nature an offense to the christian.

Until Christianity can balance its view on judaism and the jews, one should not blame the jews for hesitating in accepting kindness from christians. They have learnt it the hard way, throughout history.

2005-08-02T13:06:00.000-07:00

Still don't really know why I got myself a blog, but it's at least an easy way of getting oneself a homesite.

I'm more or less celebrating my first entire year on Linux sometime in this month. Not too sure exactly when though. I am planning to take my first steps into the *BSD world before September, and let Linux take over some of the space I've let Windows reside on. So, ~5 gb BSD, 40 gb Linux and 15 gb Windows.

As for the self-imposed deadline of posting the Bryatesle grammar with sample sentences before September, the growth on the vocabulary side is too slow for that to be realistic. Too bad about that. I'll release what I have though. Next release might be scheduled for October.

Recent things I've dealt with is:
- gapping in main clauses
- syntactic properties of quirky case subjects
- case inflection of indefinite pronouns
- adjectival morphology

I've also been thinking about what to do with coordination and nonsubjects, but I haven't come up with anything definite yet, except that either direct objects, or the object that ranks higher can be elided in coordinated constructions, but I am not sure. Also, that would force me to come up with an explicit transitivity marker, something I have preferred not to do, in order to leave the verbal morphology rather light.